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Resumen 
En el presente articulo se propone una distincion terminologica entre 'proposici6n expresada 'evitada y 'proposic16n 
expresada 'contemplada, desde una perspectiva cognitiva (sobre todo desde la teoria de la relevancw). En esta 
propuesta terminologica subyace la afirmacion de que la identificacion r:ipida, lenta o inexistente de la ironia depende 
del numero de incompatibilidades detectado por el dcstinatario en multiples activaciones mentales de !as fuentcs 
contell.iuales disponibles. Esta vision de la comprension de la ironia intenta arrojar luz sobre debates. aim por dilucidar. 
como por ejemplo el que se centra en el papel del significado literal en el procesamiento de la ironia verbal, o sobre si 
el procesamiento de la ironia necesariamente exige mas esfuerzo de procesamiento que el procesarniento de enuncia-
dos explicitos. 
Palabrds clave: ironia. teoria de la relevancia, lo indirecto, pragmatica, proposicion expresada 
Abstract 
In the present a11icle a terminological distinction between bypassed 'proposition expressed' and entertained 
'proposition expressed' is suggested from a cognitive perspective (mainly relevance-theoretic). Underlying this 
terminological proposal is the claim that the faster, slower, or nonexistent identification of irony depends on the number 
ofincompatibilities detected by the addressee in multiple mental activations of the available contextual sources. This 
picture of irony comprehension aims at shedding light on current unresolved scholarly debates such as the one on the 
role of literal meaning in the processing of verbal irony. or on whether the processing of irony necessarily demand<; 
more mental effort than the processing of explicit utterances. 
Key Words: irony, relevance theory, indirectness, pragmatics, proposition expressed. 
Resume 
Cet article essaie de proposer une distinction terminologique entre proposition exprimee evitee et proposition exprimee 
envisagee en suivant une perspective cognitive (surtout selon la thcorie de la pertinence). Cet approchc tcrminologique 
est base sur !'idee que !'identification rapide, lente ou inexistante de l'ironie depend du nombre d'incomptabilites 
detectees par le recepteur dans de nombreuses activations des sources contextuelles disponibles. Cette fa~ton de 
I would like to thank Rachel Giora and Billy Clark for their truitful comments on a previous version of this paper, 
and also Bryn Moody and Antonio Lillo for stylistic suggestions. Needless to say, I take full personal responsibility 
tor any shortcomings in this resulting a11icle. 
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corn prendre I' ironie pretend oftrir des solutions pour des de bats intellectuels qui n · ont pas encore ete resolus au present. 
par exemp(e, (e role du signifie lit1era( a i'heure de processer ('ironie Yerba le, OU si processer 1'1r0nie exige toujours 
plus d'etlort mentale que processer des enonces explicites. 
Mots (1es: ironie, theorie de la pertinence, pragmatique, proposition exprimee, l'indirect 
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1. Introduction 
What is the role of literal meaning in the interpretation of ironic utterances? Is it 
invariably retained? Is it dismissed during the processing of (nonliteral) ironic 
interpretations? Questions like these have originated a still unresolved debate between 
followers of different theoretical orientations. The present article aims at shedding light 
onto this debate by suggesting a ne\\ terminology which fits the claims of these orientations 
and ·at the same time overcomes their occasionally restrictive scope of analysis. 
The stmcture of the article is as follows: In section two Sperber and Wilson's relevance-
theory approach to irony is sketched out, together with its ad hoc terminology. Section 
three deals with the role of context in the processing of irony, taking former studies of 
irony as a theoretical framework (Yus ( 1998a, 2000)). In section four the new terminology 
(bypassed 'propos!l!on expressed': entertamed 'proposition expressed') is introduced, and 
its theoretical implications are contrasted with current theories of irony in section five. 
2. Relevance theo11· and irony: echo and dissociation 
Sperber and Wilson's (1986, 1995, henceforth S& W) relevance theory (henceforth 
RT; see Blakemore (1992); S&W (1997): and Yus (1997a, 1998b, 1998c) for comments 
and bibliography on the theory) is a cognitive approach to human communication which 
focuses on the hearer's ascription ofrelevance in the (verbal/nonverbal) stimuli that speakers 
intend to make manifest (or, rather, mutually manifest). In order to reach a potential 
candidate to match the speaker· s intended interpretation, the hearer weighs the information 
provided by the utterance against contextual information and tests interpretive hypotheses 
according to a balance of cost (processing effort) and benefit (cognitive effects). so that the 
interpretation which has the best balance is the one which the speaker supposedly intended 
to communicate. lf a first relevant interpretation is reached, all the other potential 
interpretations will be dismissed. 
Within RT, interpretation is pictured roughly as a three-stage process: 
1. Logical form. Comprehension starts off with the hearer's identification of the 
semantic representation of the speaker's utterance (S&W ( 1986: 9)). which yields 
a preliminary incomplete logical form. Logical forms can be either stored in 
conceptual memory as assumption schemas (lvhich can be later completed into 
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fully-fledged assumptions), or completed into the speakers' (intended) propositional 
forms. This phase is decoding, the only context-free phase of interpretation 
according to RT. Subsequent enrichments to yield propositions are inferential. 
2. Propositional form. The hearer then completes and enriches this logical form 
inferentially, with such cognitive operations as reference assignment. 
disambiguation. enrichment and loosening: '·a semantic representation must be 
selected, completed and enriched in various ways to yield the propositional form 
expressed by the utterance'' (S&W (1986: 179)). 
3. Exp/icature/implicature. The hearer is now in a position to be able to grasp the 
speaker's intended interpretation of the utterance, which can be explicitly or 
implicitly communicated. In either case, the proposition expressed has to be 
embedded in a higher-level proposition expressing the speaker's attitude upon 
communicating the utterance. This attitude may be related to the fact that the 
speaker believes and intends to communicate the proposition expressed by the 
utterance, in which case the proposition will be communicated as an explicalure. 
or to the fact that the speaker expects the hearer to construct an implicit 
interpretation arising from the combination of the proposition and contextual 
information. in which case the proposition expressed will not be communicated. 
but will be used as one of the necessary elements in order to reach an imp/icature.~ 
For example, the speaker of (la) can communicate the proposition expressed as an 
explicature (lb), or communicate the implicit information (le) as an implicature (S&W 
(1986: 179ft)). 
(1) a. Mary "It will get cold''. 
b. l,\fm)J believes and intends to communicate that] the dinner will 
gd cold very soon. 
c. Mary wants Peter to come and eat dinner at once . 
The difference between (lb) and (le) is the difference between explicit and implicit 
communication. In S&W's (1986: 181) words, 
r 1 b 1 includes as sub-part one of the logical forms encoded by the utterance . It is 
constructed inferent~ally, by using contextual information to complete and enrich this 
logical Corm into a propositional form, which is then optionally embedded into an 
assumption schema typically expressing an attitude toiL [le]. by contrast. is not a 
development of one ofthe logical torms encoded by the utterance~ it is constructed on the 
basis of contextual information. and in particular by developing assumption schemas 
retrieved from encyclopaedic memory. 
2 ·'The propositiOn expressed may or may not be actually ( ostensiYcly) communicated: that is. it may or may not be 
an mstance of Pin the schema 'the speaker makes mutually manifest her intention to make manifest to the addressee 
that P' . The proposthon expressed by a metaphorical. ironical or somt: other kind of non-litt:ral utt..::rance is not 
communicat..::d in this sense, but rather serves as an effective and efficient means of giving the hearer access to 
those assumptions which are eommumcated. In other \Yords. the proposition expressed may or may not be an 
'explieature ... (Carston ( 1998: 471 )). 
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Irony is a variety of implicitly communicated information. S& W have proposed an 
echoic mention theory of irony (S&W (1986, 1995, 1998): W&S (1992)) as part of a 
general relevance-theoretic distinction between interpretive use and descriptive use, and 
also as a development of their former theory of use/mention distinction (S&W ( 1981): 
Jorgensen et al. (1984)). This theory aims at overcoming the problems which cannot be 
dealt with in the traditional view of irony as conveying the opposite of what is literally (i.e, 
explicitly) said with the utterance, for example cases in which people endorse the proposition 
expressed by the utterance but are at the same time ironic. 
Ironic utterances are typically used interpretively. An ironic utterance is an interpretation 
of another thought, utterance or assumption which it resembles and which the speaker attributes 
to a different speaker or to himself/herself at another time. Besides, they are necessarily echoic 
(they simultaneously refer to an attributed thought --or utterance, or assumption- and express 
an attitude to it~ see Seto ( 1998) for discussion). Specifically, the speaker's attitude towards 
what is echoed has to be dissociative. This dissociation may refer to either the proposition 
expressed by the utterance, or to some effect that is generated by that proposition. 
An example can be found in Curc6 (1997: eh. 9): 
(2) a. (It is late and the children are not in bed) . 
b. Mother: "I love children who go to bed early". 
In situation (2a), the mother utters (2b) as a means to echo and dissociate herself 
from a thought, specifically a potential utterance which she would have liked to utter in a 
different situation such as (3 ), a situation in which (2b) would no longer be used 
interpretively, but descriptively (the mother would not only endorse the proposition eAlJressed 
by (2b) but also communicate it as an explicature fitting situation (3)): 
(3) [It is early and the children are in bed]. 
In order to reach the correct ironic interpretation of (2b ), the hearer needs to identify -
as a contextual assumption- the existence of this situation (3) which did not occur as the 
mother would have expected, which triggers the mismatch between (2a) and (2b ), and hence 
the ironic interpretation of (2b), even though the mother actually endorses the proposition 
expressed by (2b) (she does love children who go to be early). In Curc6's (ibid.) words, 
in (3], the speaker would be in a position to utter (2b] descriptively, and, crucially, to 
endorse all its potential implicatures. In [3], her utterance would logically imply that she 
loves her own children and that one ofthe reasons she loves them is because they have 
gone to bed early. When this situation fails to materialise, she ironically echoes the utterance 
she had earlier hoped to be able to produce. In the actual circumstances, [2a], her utterance 
does not have the implication that she loves her children, at least, not because they go to 
bed early. 
So, the mother is implicitly expressing her attitude of dissociation from the potential 
implicature in [4]: 
(4) I love my own children because they go to bed early. 
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The identification of the discrepancy between siruations (2a) and (3) is essential to 
discovery the irony in (2b): 
The speaker of [2b] is echoing a potential utterance that she could have produced in 
a sintation S,, different from S0, when the utterance is in fact produced. She dissociates 
from some of the potential implicanrres that the utterance would have if uttered in S1. To 
recognise these facts, a hearer has to notice that while S0, the achlal context, contains [2a], 
the non-acrual but stereotypically desirable S1, contains [3]. Part of the relevance of [2bl 
when uttered in S0 is to make strongly murually manifest [2a] (Curc6, ibid.). 
S&W (1998: 289) comment upon a similar example: In (2b) "the speaker agrees 
with the literal meaning of her utterance, and would not want to dissociate herself from it. 
So where does the irony come from? ( ... ) [2b], literally understood, is inappropriate not 
because it is false, but because of the circumstances of utterance. What is being ironically 
echoed is the higher-order explicahlre ... that [2b], literally understood. is relevant in the 
circumstances. The circumstances should be such that the mother could relevantly say [2b] 
without irony: that is, [an alternative situation such as (3))". 
3. The role of context in the processing of iron)' 
In Yus (1998a: further developed in Yus (2000)), it was claimed that a multiple-
source simultaneous activation of contextual information is essential for a fast 
processing of the ironic interpretation of utterances. It was hypothesized that the 
proposition expressed by the utterance has to be incompatible 'vith the information 
provided by one, several, or all of these sources, so that the more incompatibilities 
detected, the easier it should be to reach the ironic interpretation.' In Yus ( 1998a) a 
so-called principle ofoptimal accessr hili ty to irony 'vas proposed taking this hypothesis 
as a premise. It was turned into a criterion in Yus (2000) and slightly modified: 
3 Needless to say, I am not claiming that one invariably needs multiple conteh.1Ual activations in order to reach an 
ironic interpretation. Indeed, one hears nice weather! in the middle of a downpour, and cannot help noticing an 
incompatibility between the proposition expressed by the utterance and the information provided by the physical 
environment, one single source triggering an attitude of dissociation. However. it is not the abrlity to access irony 
that is being discussed (although hearers do differ in their ability to integrate information from difterent contextual 
sources), but the idea of accessibility making this abrlity more effort-savillg. The same utterance (nice weather!) 
when said in a typically ironic tone of voice (Kreuz et al. ( 1999: 1686)) and maybe with a smile on the speaker's 
face, is bound to have so much contextual information supporting an attitude of dissociation that the effort required 
to process the ironic interpretation of the utterance will necessarily decrease. 
Furthermore, in Yus (2000) a new terminology is proposed to cover this fact: it is assumed that in every 
conversational situation in which the speaker intends to convey an ironic interpretation there is one conte)l.1ual 
source whose information is surely very accessible (i.e., it is highly manitcst to the hearer in the course of the 
conversation), at least more accessible than other contextual sources. The incompatibility detected between the 
proposition expressed by the utterance and the information provided by this single contextual source is enough to 
detect the speaker's attitude of dissociation and reach an ironic reading of the utterance. Consequently, it is labelled 
leading contextual source. There may also be one or several additional conteh.1ual sources reaffirming the hypothesis 
of an ironic interpretation, providing a high degree of informative support capable of leading to the ironic 
interpretation much faster. These arc called supportive contextual sources. Which of the contex-tual sources is a 
candidate to become a leading context11al source depends on the attributes ofthe speech situation, the utterance 
itself, and the hearer's inferential capabilities and cognitive resources. 
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CRITERION OF OPTIMAL ACC ESSIBILin' TO IROI"Y 
The processing etTort required tor the interpretation of the intended ironic meaning 
of an utterance decreases in proportion to the increase in the number (and quality) of 
incompatibilitics (detected by the addressee) between the information supplied by the 
inferential integration of simultaneously actiYated contextual sources (leading or leading 
plus supportive [see note 3]) and the intormation provided by the proposition expressed 
by the utterance . 
When the incompatibility detected between the proposition expressed by the utterance 
and the information provided by one or several contextual sources reaches a certain level 
of redundancy. the hearer effort-savingly infers that the speaker is being dissociative tmYards 
this proposition. and that a an ironic reading is intended. The (highly salient) incompatibility 
prm·ided by a leading contextual source may be enough to set off this search for irony. but 
its access may be accelerated by the simultaneous identification of incompatibilities found 
in the information supplied by other supportive sources. These sources and their 
incompatibilities are listed below: 
A. Factual information Incompatibility with factuaL encyclopaedic, and 
commonsense assumptions about the world we li\·e 
Ill. 
B. Physical setting Incompatibility with a salient phenomenon from the 
speech setting surrounding the interlocutors in the 
course of a conversation. 
C. Nonverbal communication Incompatibility with normal nonverbal behaviour 
which typically accompanies verbal speech. 
D. Biographical data Incompatibility with the speaker·s opinions. 
character, habits and attitudes about life and the world 
we live in. 
E. Mutual knowledge Incompatibility with information which is supposedly 
shared between the interlocutors. 
F. Previous utterances Incompatibility (in the current conversational context) 
of the repeated utterance with the information 
provided explicitly by the same utterance in previous 
stages of the conversation or even farther away in 
time. Alternatively, incompatibility between the 
assumptions arising from the interpretation of 
previous utterances and the information provided by 
the current utterance. 
G. Linguistic cues Incompatibility with linguistic choices and sentential 
structures which are typically used for ordinary 
communication. 
The picture outlined here is that of multiple cuntextual sources providing parallel 
reasons for the hearer to reach the conclusion that the speaker 's intended interpretation of 
his/her utterance might be ironic (and the parallel conclusion that there is a discrepancy 
between the proposition expressed by the utterance and the interpretation really meant by 
Pragmaling li istica. 8-9, 2000-200 I, 349- 374 
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the speaker: see Torrcs Sanchez (1999: 99-102) for discussion). If the level of informative 
support provided by these contextual sources is high enough (depending on the hearer's 
processing ability and his/her accessibility to contextual information). then the ironic 
interpretation of the utterance lvill be easily identified: the hearer ,,·ill have overwhelming 
contextual support to conclude that the speaker's attitude to,,ards his/her utterance is 
dissociative. Similarly. if the number of contextual sources accessed and subsequent 
incompatibilities detected is not high enough or even nonexistent. a misunderstanding of 
the ironic interpretation might take place. 
An example of rich contextual support is quoted iu (S) below (Yus (2000). slightly 
adapted from Yus (l998a)): 
(5) a . [Cold, we/, windy English spring in London J 
b. [Smiling. with a distinctive tone ~(voicel '·When a man is tired of 
London. he is tired of life' ' 
c. I am tired ofliving in London. 
d. [Sunny day in London, livelv atmosphere in the streets, fill le or 
no lraffic l. 
e. Some of the reasons why everybody likes London are its "·eathcr. 
lively atmosphere and little traflic 
S&W claim that in order to reach the ironic sense of (Sb), the hearer is expected to 
label it as a quotation (echo) towards which the speaker has an attitude of dissociation (in 
this particular example, (5b) may actually be a literal quotation of Dr. Johnson). Indeed. 
there is nothing to prevent the effective interpretation of the ironic sense of (5b). since the 
contextual information invalidates any chance that the speaker intended to communicate 
-as an explicature-the proposition expressed by (5b). Clearly. the speaker is ironically 
echoing a more pleasurable situation such as (5d) (in which s/he could have endorsed the 
proposition expressed by ( 5b) and its strong implicatures. for instance (Se)). instead of the 
disappointing -and mutually manifest- situation (Sa). Therefore. reaching (Se) is 
minimally effort-demanding and provides the only relevant information available. No doubt, 
identifying (5b) as a quote (and as a change of register contradicting normal communicative 
means) is just one of multiple incompatibilities that the hearer can detect simultaneously 
in several contextual sources. and whose contextual support triggers the ironjc interpretation 
in the course of the conversation. As shown in (5[). several contextual sources provide 
multiple incompatibilities with the proposition expressed by (5b): 
(5) f SOL:RCE 
Factual inCormaiion 
Phys1cal setting 
IC\CO\!PATIBILITY 
Nonverbal communication 
Biographical data 
Mutual knowledge 
Previous ut1erances 
Linguistic cues 
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In this example, there are incompatibilities with the hearer's knowledge of typical 
characteristics of London (FACTUAL INFORJviATION), with the terrible weather causing the hearer 
to be tired (PHYSICAL SETTING), with the stereotypical nonverbal behaviour that is normally 
used for assertions (NoNVERBAL co"NnvruNicATioN), with the hearer's prior knowledge of the 
speaker's opinion about London (BIOGRAPHICAL DATi\), with speaker/hearer shared opinions 
about London (rvruTuAL KNO\VLEDGE), and with normal, discursive structures used in casual 
conversations, since there is a distinctive change of register in (5b) (S&W (1981: 559)) 
(LINGUISTic cuEs). However, previous utterances (in the conversation) do not seem to play 
any role in indicating the speaker's dissociative attitude. 
An example of poor contextual support is quoted in (6) below (Yus (1998a)), in 
which Bill 's utterance in (6b) is meant to communicate the interpretation (6c): 
(6) a. [Passengers Tom and Bill sitting together on a b·ain. After a while 
they strike up a conversation. Tom is reading a paper and makes 
a comment on one of the headlines] . 
b. Tom: "Listen, it says here that sixty per cent of women are still 
unemployed in this country'"· 
Bill : "Yeah! Keep them in the kitchen where they belong!". 
Tom : "Do you think all women should be housewives?" . 
Bill: "Of course not! [was only joking, for God's sake'"· 
c. Yeah! It is sad to think that so many women are unemployed . 
Clearly, the proposition expressed provided by Bill's utterance is not incompatible 
with any information from contextual sources, as we can see in (6d): 
(6) d. SOURCE 
Factual information 
Physical setting 
Nonverbal communication 
Biographical data 
Mutual knowledge 
Previous utterances 
Linguistic cues 
INCOMPATIBILITY 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
No source of incompatibility in Tom's accessible contextual information can be 
found for Bill's proposition. Not even Tom's factual knowledge about women not 
deserving to be kept in the kitchen is activated, because it is also a factual assumption 
that not everybody agrees on the role of women in society. Tom does not find 
incompatibilities in the other contextual sources, not even in Bill's nonverbal 
behaviour, since Bill utters his statement in a default, neutral tone of voice, without 
any special facial gesture and with no striking sentential structure or vocabulary choice. 
Tom's misunderstanding of Bill's ironic utterance was indeed predictable. Although 
Bill echoes a cultural norm and dissociates himself from the proposition expressed by 
his utterance, lack of contextual support on Tom's side (rather than Bill's defective 
communicative efforts) explains why Bill's communicative intention proves 
unsuccessful. Besides, Bill and Tom are strangers. As such, Bill should have 
Pragmalingiiistica. 8-9, 2000-2001, 349- 374 
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concentrated on very salient aspects of the physical setting for the construction of 
ironic interpretations. Physical eo-presence (Cl ark and Mars hall (1981)) usually helps 
to reach "communicative success between listeners and speakers whose degree of 
shared common ground is unknown. lf someone makes an ironic remark to a stranger 
at a bus stop, the reference will probably be to some perceptually salient phenomenon, 
such as the \veather, or the fact that the bus is late. Since the listener can directly 
perceive the mismatch between the situation and the utterance, he or she can conclude 
that the speaker is employing irony" (Kreuz et al. (1999: 1686)). The same can be 
said about Bill and Tom 's conversation. 
4. Bypassed ~proposition expressed' versus entertained ~proposition expressed' 
One of the main points under discussion with respect to the subject of irony is the one 
concerning the role of literal meaning in the processing of ironic utterances. Is the literal 
meaning processed, and then dismissed in favour of an alternative ironic meaning (Stan-
dard Pragmatic Theory), or are both literal and ironic meanings computed (Graded Salience 
Hypothesis), or is the ironic interpretation perhaps accessed without a prior processing of 
the literal meaning (Direct Transfer Theory)'? As will be discussed in heading five below, 
the distinction between bypassed 'proposition expressed' and entertained 'proposition 
expressed' covers most of these possibilities. 
As I have sketched out above, after reaching the proposition expressed by the speaker's 
utterance, the hearer -with the aid of contextual information- has to make interpretive 
hypotheses on whether the speaker intends to conununicate this 'proposition expressed' as 
explicit information (i.e., as an explicature), or expects the hearer to access one or several 
contextual assumptions which, when combined with the proposition expressed, will yield 
implicitly communicated information (i.e., as an implicature) not directly derivable from 
that proposition. Interpreting both explicatures and implicatures is effort-demanding4 , 
and reaching the proposition expressed by the utterance also demands cognitive effort, 
which hearers are willing to make in exchange for the eventual relevance which the utterance 
will (supposedly) yield . However, some authors have dismissed the effort to reach the 
proposition expressed almost as straightfonvard decoding. On the contrary, it should be 
4 Furthermore, I have come to the conclusion that processing ironic utterances (except in cases of highly 
conventionalized ironic phrases; see Alba Juez ( 1998); on Spanish conventionalized phrases, see Penades Martinez 
(1999)) tends to be more effort-demanding than processing explicitly communicated information (which is a 
direct embedding of the proposition expressed in a higher-level assumption incorporating the speaker's attitude to 
it). Some authors, for instance Giora ( 1995, 1998a), think that RT does not consider the possibility of(nonliteral) 
ironic interpretation being more costly in terms of processing effort than explicitly communicated information. 
However, as Curc6 ( 1997: eh. 9) correctly points out, "nothing in the relevance-theoretic approach to irony denies 
that the proposition expressed by the utterance is computed during the processing of an ironic utterance. Not only 
that, but... a number of related propositions that are part ofthe context of interpretation, notably, contradictory 
ones, need to be entertained roughly simultaneously during processing m order to derive an ironic interpretation. 
Moreover, the relevance-theoretic approach to irony certainly does not predict that processing irony will be a 
'simpler task ' than that of understanding non-ironic language. Quite the opposite". A similar conclusion was 
reached by Dews and Winner ( 1999). An essential claim in this article is that rich contextual support (i.e. , contextual 
information which can become manifest in the course of interpreting an ironic utterance) may reduce the 
supplementive effort until a similar processing demand is reached for explicit and ironic communication. 
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underlined that hearers have to devote a certain processing effort to this task, \vhich often 
involves mentally tiring operations such as disambiguation, enrichment, loosening, and 
reference assignment. For example, the hearer often has to enrich the logical form so that 
it becomes a tmth-evaluable proposition, as in (7a), which the hearer will surely process 
until a much more relevant proposition such as (7b) is recovered (see Blakemore (1989): 
Vicente (1998): Carston (1996)): 
(7) a. Ann: "It will take us some time to get there". 
b It will take longer to get there than you think. 
Secondly, the fact that the proposition expressed is context-bound has often been 
underestimated. Unlike Grice's (1975) proposal of saying/ implicating, in \vhich only 
the latter has truly contextual connotations (contextual features in the former are 
restricted to reference assignment and disambiguation), all of the relevance-theoretic 
terms proposition expressed, explicature and implicature are generated through the 
mediation of context. Indeed, since Grice (1975) proposed his popular distinction, up 
to now little attention had been paid to the proposition expressed by utterances, taking 
for granted that "any meaning not derived by linguistic encoding must be implicated 
[ ... ] The explanation for cutting things this way lies with the further assumption that 
the explicature must be truth-evaluable; so Grice and the Griceans are prepared to let 
in just whatever is necessary in addition to linguistically determined content to bring 
the representation up to a complete propositional form" (Carston (1988: 160-163): 
for analysts endorsing this perspective see references therein). Of course, this is far 
from satisfactory: reaching the proposition expressed by the speaker's utterance 
involves several "processes which are just as dependent on context and pragmatic 
principles as is the derivation of implicatures" (Carston (ibid.: 160))." 
5 In Gibbs and Moise ( 1997) '.\'e find the following example: 
(l) (a) Robert broke a finger last night. 
[contextual a:mtmptions: The speaker is a football player in the same team as Robert. The speaker is responding 
to a question about Robert's whereabouts, asked by the team coach on the day of a big game]. 
(h) Robert broke a finger, either his own or someone else's, on the night prior to uttering (8a). 
(c) Robert broke his own finger on the night prior to uttering (8a). 
(d) Robert can 't play the game today 
According to the standard Gricean picture, (1 b) would be 'what is literally said'; ( 1 c) would be a 'generalized 
conversational implicature' ~and ( 1 d) would be a 'particularized conversational implicature ' . For Recanati ( 1989), 
(lb) would be a 'minimal proposition' not consciously available to people: (le) would be 'what is said ' (an 
enriched explicature consciously available to people)~ and (I d) would be an implicature. Within RT, ( l b) would 
be considered (a la Grice) the proposition strictly and literally expressed by ( 1 a), "the minimal proposition that 
can be constructed from the semantic representation ofthe utterance, something which departs as little as possible 
ll·om encoded content and yet which has a determinate truth-condition" (Carston (1996 85 )). RT is more interested 
in (1 c), the proposition expressed by ( 1 a), a proposition pragmatically constructed out of the concepts encoded in 
the logical form of the utterance and communicated explicitly as an explicature, or serving as one of the elements 
needed to derive a conte;.,.i-bound implicature ( l d). 
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In this paper, I underline the idea that the hearer's processing may well reach the 
"context-bound proposition expressed" , make a hypothesis about the possibility of a 
"propositional form-as-intended" interpretation, and not access the eventually intended 
ironic interpretation (in other words, not identify the echoic quality of the utterance plus 
the speaker's dissociative attitude towards the proposition), unless context guarantees a 
cognitive reward in exchange for the supplementive mental effort required to access further 
interpretive assumptions. Consequently, if"utterance comprehension consists in the recovery 
of an enumerable set of assumptions, some explicitly expressed, others implicitly conveyed, 
but all individually intended by the speaker" (S&W (1986: 195)), then it is perfectly plau-
sible that the speaker intends to communicate only the explicit information provided by 
the proposition expressed by the utterance, especially if the utterance is an ordinary assertion 
which communicates its own propositional form.6 
The possibility that utterances convey only the propositional form as an explicature 
is particularly important for the study of irony, since hearers may well stop their processing 
of the utterance at that propositionallevel, find it consistent with the principle of relevance, 
and therefore not test other hypotheses such as a potential intended (implicit) irony.7 We 
should not forget that ''the deductive device simply uses the most accessible context first 
and only extends it if the effects aren't adequate [ ... 1 The mind then can't be said to search 
for a context which maximizes relevance. Rather it simply chums through a 'given' hierarchy 
of contexts in order of accessibility until it is satisfied" (Downes (1998: 343-344)). It will 
be assumed, then, that the hearer will not look for an ironic interpretation unless that 
implicit interpretation is made accessible (i.e., highly manifest) or the information provided 
by the proposition expressed makes little or no sense (it is not relevant) in the course of the 
conversation. It will be assumed, in short, that it is the strength of context_ specifically the 
contextual support provided by the incompatibility detected in the information provided 
by one or several contextual sources, that triggers the identification of the speaker's attitude 
of dissociation towards the utterance and also short-circuits a hypothetically plausible 
explicit interpretation (see Attardo (forthcoming) and Utsumi (forthcoming) for similar 
views of the role of context in the interpretation of irony). 
The strength of context is, then, responsible for how much attention the hearer pays 
to the proposition expressed by the utterance before reaching the intended ironic 
interpretation. In this article it \vi!! be assumed that there are two degrees of attention that 
the hearer may hold after accessing the logical form of the utterance. The first degree, 
involving such preliminary cognitive operations as reference assignment, enrichment, 
loosening, and disambiguation of the logical form, always takes place in the cognitive 
6 Many misunderstandings in communication are a consequence of the hearer ·s inability to estimate to what ex-tent 
the speaker wants to communicate the explicit or the implicit information that can be inferred from his/her utterance. 
In this sense, a number of categories of misunderstandings have hcen isolated: (i) explicature unidentified: (ii) 
intended cxplicature turned implicature: (iii) implicature unidentified: and (iY) intended implicature turned 
unintended explicature (see Yus (1997b, l99Rd, 199Se, 199Rf, !999a, 1999b) for discussion). 
7 In Yus ( 1998[), the speaker's intention to communicate the proposition expressed as an explieature is labelled 
d1rect intention, whereas the speaker's intention to communicate an implicature is called indirect intention. The 
Spanish counterparts (in Yus ( 1997b )) are intencion explicativa and intene~im implicativa respect ively. 
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process of comprehension, regardless of the explicit/implicit quality of the intended 
interpretation. The second degree, cognitively deeper, refers to the hearer's making a 
hypothesis that the proposition expressed by the utterance may well be the intended 
interpretation, and this hypothesis will be formulated unless the implicit interpretation of 
the utterance has become conventionalized by repeated social use, the proposition expressed 
makes no sense in the current conversational interaction (typically in metaphors such as 
'you are an ace up my sleeve', whose explicit information cannot possibly be conununicated), 
or unless the information supplied by manifest contextual assumptions (rendering the 
'proposition-expressed-as-intended' hypothesis irrelevant) invalidates it (for example, 
leading the hearer to test a much more relevant implicit, i.e. ironic, interpretation). 
An example will illustrate this proposal of dual-degree processing. Let us imagine, 
first, that the utterance (8b) is said in the contextual situation (8a) with the intended implicit 
interpretation (8c): 
(8) a. [Ann and Tom have owned a cat for four days. Ann has already 
noticed that whenever the cat is hungry, it goes to the kitchen 
and sits on its mat as a signal to ask for food. Ann (wrongly) 
thinks that Tom has also noticed this habit (i.e., that this 
information is mutually manifest)] . 
b. Ann: "Tom! the cat is sitting on the matl'' 
c. Ann wants Tom to feed the cat. 
In this example, Tom will decode Mary's logical form and enrich it by providing 
reference assignment to cat and mat, identify the declarative mood of the utterance, and 
infer that Mary believes in (8b), and intends to communicate (8b), thereby reaching the 
inferential explicature (9): 
(9) Mary [intends to make manifest that she] believes that the cat which 
we own is sit1ing on the mat which is in the kitchen at timet. 
Not only does Tom make these inferential steps in order to reach the explicature of 
Mary's utterance. Faced with very weak contextual information, he cannot help 
hypothesizing that the proposition expressed by (8b) is Mary's intended interpretation 
(explicature), that is, that Mary wants to inform Tom about the eat's exact location in the 
house, no matter how implausible this mere ' informing' of the eat's situation may seem to 
Tom, the context does not provide any alternative (i.e., more accessible) interpretation to 
test for relevance. 
Consider now the utterance (1 Ob), when said in the contextual situation (lOa) with 
the intended implicit interpretation (lOc): 
(10) a. [Ann and Tom have owned a cat for eight years and both Ann 
and Tom noticed long ago that whenever the cat is hungry, it 
goes to the kitchen and sits on its mat as a signal to askforfood 
(i.e., this information is highly mutually manifest)]. 
b. Ann. "Tom' the cat is sitting on the mat!". 
c. Ann wants Tom to feed the cat. 
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Again, Tom will have to assign a referent to cat and mat and identify the mood and 
attitude that Mary has when uttering (lOb). However, (lOb) differs from (8b) in that now 
there is a highly salient contextual assumption (10) which Tom can easily extract from 
background information and combine with the proposition expressed by (lOb) to yield the 
implicature in (lOc): 
( ll) The cat alw·ays sits on the mat whenever it is hungry. 
This contextual assumption (11) is highly accessible in situation (lOa), since "as a 
result of some kind of habituation, the more a representation is processed, the more accessible 
it becomes. Hence, the greater the amount of processing involved in the formation of an 
assumption, and the more often it is accessed thereafter, the greater its accessibility" (S&W 
(1986: 77)). It can be predicted, then, that Tom will have no difficulty in accessing the 
implicit interpretation (lOc) . But does this mean that he does not process the proposition 
expressed by (lOb) at all and instead goes straight into (lOc) with the aid of contextual 
information (11)? Undoubtedly, some minimal contextualization (reference assignment, 
disambiguation, enrichment. .. ) of the logical form is always necessary, even for easy-to-
access implicatures such as (1 Oc). What Tom does not do in situation ( 1 Oa), unlike situation 
(8a), is to devote extra cognitive effort to hypothesize on whether the proposition expressed 
by (lOb) equals Mary 's intended interpretation (in other words, whether (lOb) is an 
explicature). The salience of(ll) triggers the relevance of the implicit interpretation (lOc). 
From now on, hvo types of 'proposition expressed by the utterance ' will be suggested, 
which play an important role in how implicit meanings (irony included) are accessed and 
processed: 
a) BYPASSED 'PROPOSITION EXPRESSED' 
The proposition expressed by the speaker 's utterance which the hearer, due to the 
strength of contextual information making an alternative implicit meaning more 
relevant, does not process as the speaker's intended interpretation. 
b) ENTERTAINED 'PROPOSITION EXPRESSED' 
The proposition expressed by the speaker's utterance which the hearer, faced 
with an absence of adequate manifest contextual information making an alternative 
implicit meaning more relevant, processes as the speaker 's intended interpretation. 
This dichotomy is important in understanding how the ironic interpretation of an 
utterance is processed and, despite being new terminology, it is compatible with relevance-
theoretic claims on how processing takes place: by communicating messages explicitly 
(the proposition expressed communicated as an explicature), speakers spare hearers a lot 
of processing effort. So, when "giving [an indirect utterance, the speaker] must have expected 
to achieve some additional contextual effects not obtainable from [an explicit message], 
which would offset the additional effort needed to process [the intended implicit meaning] 
( ... ) [T]he surplus of information given in an indirect [utterance] must achieve some 
relevance in its own righf' ( S& W ( 1986: 196-197)). 
Consequently, when faced with a typically explicit ordinary assertion (whose main 
proposition is also its explicature ), for example, and given poor or nonexistent invalidating 
contextual sources triggering the identification of the speaker 's attitude of dissociation toward 
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the utterance (and its echoic quality) leading to an ironic reading of the utterance, the hearer 
may think that the message provided by the proposition expressed matches the speaker" s 
intended interpretation (i.e. , the speaker intends to communicate it as an explicature). Why 
would the hearer make effort-demanding interpretive extensions when there is nothing in the 
context to make him/her think that testing alternative or potential implicit meanings of the 
utterance \\ill be informationally re,,arding? Hence, given poor/nonexistent invalidation from 
context, the hearer may be led to both reaching the proposition expressed by the utterance 
(reference assignment, etc.) and also to making the hypothesis that this proposition is the 
intended interpretation (entertained 'proposition expressed'). On the other hand, when the 
invalidation from context is strong, the hearer will skip, as it were, this 'propositional fonn-
as-intended' hypothesis and find it easier to identify the speaker 's attitude of dissociation and 
the echoic quality of the utterance, essential aspects of ironic interpretation (bypassed 
'proposition expressed '). One of the claims in this article (and also in Yus ( 1998a, 2000)) is 
that the supplementive cognitive effort to reach tllis implicit (ironic) meaning can be reduced 
by accessing manifest conte:\1ual assumptions from multiple sources simultaneously (so that 
on some occasions the infonnative support may even result in similar processing effort for 
literal and ironic interpretations of utterances). 
A parallel hypothesis is that the contextualization needed to reach the proposition 
expressed is always required, while the deeper cognitive effort required to formulate a hypothesis 
on whether or not the speaker's intended interpretation is an explicature or an implicature 
will depend on the strength of contextual information (which may be accessible to the hearer 
from different -sometimes simultaneously activated- contextual sources). This claim is 
consistent with several psychological ex,eriments which showed that in the interpretation of 
irony some aspects of the literal meaning must always be processed (Dews and Wim1er ( 1995: 
16; 1999: 1596)). For example, Winner and Gardner (1993: 426) claim that the interpretation 
of implicit messages entails not only grasping the speaker's meatling, but also melalinguistic 
mvareness: "keeping in mind the literal sentence meaning and hearing the contrast between 
what is said and what is meant" . In De\\'S and Williler ( 1999) it is suggested that '·some 
aspects of the literal meaning must be processed, and these aspects calor the hearer's 
interpretation. While a strictly compositional analysis of words in an utterance may not lead a 
hearer directly to an interpretation, a literal interpretation of those words, combined with the 
hearer's knowledge of the world (including knowledge of the speaker), is what leads to an 
interpretation. In other words, the compositional meaning must play a part in detennining 
conveyed meaning". However, in cases of bypassed 'proposition expressed ' the role of the 
proposition ex])resscd as a hypothetical intended interpretation is minimized under the pressure 
of context. As Myers Roy (1978, in Barbe ( 1995: 43)) suggests, "irony, a fom1 of indirectness 
[ ... ] [appears] in those contexts where direct communication is to some degree inhibited. 
either socially or psychologically". 
Although contextual attributes and the hearer 's particular cognitive resources in 
specific conversational situations cannot be calculated beforehand, in general three 
prototypical cases of irony comprehension may be predicted: 
1. A high level of manifest infonnation provided by single or multiple, simultaneously 
activated (leading and supportive) contextual sources, leads to a fast identification 
of a mismatch between contextual infonnation and the proposition expressed by the 
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utterance, which foregrounds the speaker's dissociative attitude underlying the ironic 
interpretation of the utterance without much mental effort. This case typically leads 
to a bypassed 'proposition expressed'. Example (5) above would fit this case. 
2. A low level of manifest information provided by single or multiple, simultaneously 
activated (leading and supportive) contextual sources, leads to a slow identification 
of a mismatch between contextual information and the proposition expressed by 
the utterance, which in this case does not foreground the speaker's dissociative 
attitude underlying the ironic interpretation of the utterance in a straightforward 
way. This case leads to a bypassed 'proposition expressed' if eventually the hearer 
relies on this contextual support, however weak, in order to reach the intended 
ironic interpretation, or leads to an entertained 'proposition expressed' if contextual 
support does not guarantee a cognitive reward in exchange for the supplementive 
mental effort required to test an alternative (implicit) interpretation. In either 
case, the hearer is cognitively aware of an explicit/implicit duality, since the effort 
required for the hypothesis that the speaker might intend to communicate the 
proposition expressed as an explicature is not straightfonvardly short-circuited 
by contextual strength. 
3. An insufficient level of manifest information provided by single or multiple, 
simultaneously activated (leading and supportive) contextual sources, leads to a 
nonexistent identification of a mismatch between contextual information and the 
proposition expressed by the utterance, which should have foregrounded the 
speaker's dissociative attitude underlying the ironic interpretation of the utterance. 
This case typically leads to an entertained 'proposition expressed' (the proposition 
expressed by the utterance is the first and only information found consistent with 
the principle of relevance). Instead of an optimal interpretation, in this case a 
misunderstanding of the utterance (intended implicature turned unintended 
explicature) will take place. The hearer is not aware of the ironic interpretation 
underlying the speaker's utterance. Example (6) above would fit this case. 
In the next section, current theories of irony will be compared to the new tenninological 
proposal in this and previous research (Yus (1998a, 2000)). 
5. Criterion, bypassed/entertained 'proposition expressed', and current theories of irony 
The model of irony comprehension presented in this article is compatible with most of 
the claims made by analysts of irony in the last few years. However, it also sheds light on the 
restrictive scope of some of these theories. 8 We will analyse them briefly in the next headings. 
5.1. Standard pragmatic theory 
According to this theory, processing an ironic utterance also involves the prior 
processing of the literal meaning of the utterance, which is later rejected for a more plau-
sible nonliteral-ironic- interpretation. This idea underlies Grice's ( 1975) view of irony 
(see Glucksberg, Gildea and Bookin (1982), and Glucksberg (1995: 55)). 
8 For a review of theories of irony, see Barbe ( 1995) and Torres Sanchez (1999). 
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The view presented in this article does not predict that such "literal-then-nonliteral-
processing" situations may occur, since Grice's view is too restrictive. It should be stressed 
that within RT the literal meaning (i.e., the propositional form) of the utterance is not 
rejected and replaced by a nonliteral interpretation, but remains, either as an intermediate 
stage between the logical form and the (highly accessible) ironic interpretation (bypassed 
'proposition expressed') or actually as a hypothesis for the intended interpretation, that is, 
for the proposition communicated as an explicature (entertained 'proposition expressed'). 
The view presented here is, perhaps, closer to Bredin 's (l997: 13-14 ), when he states that 
"irony [is] produced by a process in which they [explicit/implicit meanings] interact with 
one another. It is in grasping this interaction that the listener comes to understand the 
speaker's intended meaning in its totality" . The situation which would at least resemble 
Grice's view is case 2 above, in which lack of contextual support raises doubts about the 
speaker's intended interpretation. However, in this case, even if the hearer may be aware 
of an explicit/implicit duality, the proposition expressed by the utterance will not be rejected 
and replaced with an implicit interpretation, but retained as an essential means to reach 
that interpretation. 
5.2. Direct transfer theory 
Followers of this thcory9 (among others, Gibbs (l979, 1983, l986a, l986b, 1994): 
lnhoff, Lima and Carron (1984)~ Gibbs and O'Brien (1991)~ Gibbs and Gerrig (1989): 
Gildea and Glucksberg (1983)) claim that processing the literal meaning of an utterance is 
no precondition to reaching the intended irony. Rather, irony is processed directly so that 
there is no substantial difference in how people process (and how long they take to process) 
explicit and implicit interpretations (Gibbs and O'Brien (1991: 524-525); Gibbs (1986a: 
4); Barbe (1995: 52)). 
The criterion of optimal accessibility (Yus ( 1998a, 2000)) predicts conversations in 
which, due to the richness and variety of incompatibilities between the proposition expressed 
by the utterance and the infonnation provided by contextual sources, a bypassed 'proposition 
expressed' will occur and irony will be accessed very easily (case 1 above). Therefore, the 
hearer will not be forced into devoting any extra cognitive effort to a two-stage processing 
of a literallnonliteral interpretation. In these situations, the interpretation of irony need 
not take longer10 to process than an ordinary assertion corrununicating infonnation explicitly. 
However, the criterion also predicts that, under certain circumstances, an awareness of a 
literal/ironic duality (case 2) or even an incomplete interpretation of irony (case 3) may in 
9 Also called processing equivalence hypothesis (Giora, Fein and Schwartz ( 1998: 84)) and direct access view 
(Giora and Fein (l999a)). 
10 One of the experiments by Gibbs is to provide a text with two alternative comments: Harry was building an 
addition to his house. He was working real hard ... His younger brother was supposed to help, but he never showed 
up. At the end of the day Harry's brother did turn up, and Harry said to him: "You are a big help" (sarcastic) I "You 
are not helping me'" (non-sarcastic). The processing results indicate that readers did not take longer to process the 
sarcastic remark than the literal one. However, as Giora ( 1995: 250) comments, the sarcastic remark is highly 
appropriate in the specific situation, whereas the nonliteral is simply redundant. Giora concludes that even if 
Gibbs proves that processing irony may indeed require the same effort as processing literal utterances, he cannot 
account tor the fact that irony is sometimes even easier lo understand. 
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fact occur due to little or no contextual support, a possibility \>v·hich the adherents of this 
theory do not seem to account for. The criterion plus the newly introduced terminology for 
the proposition expressed (bypassed/entertained) accounts for more interpretive degrees 
in the explicit/implicit interface than these analysts contemplate. 
5.3. Echoic mention theory 
This is the theory proposed by S&W (1986, 1995); W&S (1992)), in which they 
claim that irony necessarily "involves the expression of an attitude of disapproval 
[ ... ] The speaker echoes a thought she attributes to someone else, while dissociating 
herself from it" (W &S (1992: 60)). Besides the speaker 's attitude, the notion of echo 
has acquired an increasing importance in this theory while, at the same time, becoming 
increasingly broad. It now "goes beyond what would generally be understood by the 
ordinary-language word ·echo'. It covers not only cases of direct and immediate echoes 
[ ... ] but also echoes of (real or imaginary) attributed thoughts [ ... ] and echoes of 
norms or standard expectations" (S&W, 1998: 284). 11 
The theory -which this and previous studies (Yus (1998a, 2000)) complement-
has been criticised or commented upon by a number of analysts (see, among others, Martin 
(1992); Barbe (1995: 45-48); Giora (1995): Seto (1998)), not so much for the requirement 
of the speaker's attitude of disapproval, as for the loose concept of echo. Actually, the 
criterion plus the newly introduced terminology -bypassed/entertained proposition-
predicts the hearer's identification ofincompatibilities in the activation of different domain-
specific contextual sources. These incompatibilities foreground the existence of an attitude 
of dissociation and are also related to S&W's echo: 
1. Actual utterances may be repeated (S&W's mention) for the sake of irony. The 
utterance, which fitted in the previous context, is now repeated in a new incompatible 
context, which activates the contextual source of "previous utterances" (source F). 1 ~ An 
example is quoted in (l2c), echoing (12a) in a (now incompatible) situation (l2b) 
(Hamamoto (1998: 258), slightly modified): 
( 12) a. Ann: "It's a lovely day for a picnic'"· 
b. [They go for a picnic and it rains]. 
c. Ann: "It's a lovely day for a picnic. indeed t" . 
2. Echoes of the speaker ·s attitude can be traced using the activation of such contextual 
sources as "the hearer's background knmvledge ofthe speaker's biographical data·· (source 
D) (including his/her opinions, tastes, and interests) and "mutual knowledge" (source E). 
For instance, in situation (13a) the attitude of dissociation is made manifest only if the 
hearer knows that Ann dislikes overcrmvded bars and prefers a quiet atmosphere: 
11 Kreuz and Glucksberg ( 1989) also have an echoic reminder rhe01y of irony which '"highlights the role of 
expectations and how people remind each other of such expectations" (Kreuz and Roberts ( 1995 : 23 )). 
12 This may imply that the activation of irony based on the actual repetition of an utterance caru10t occur on its own, 
but needs a contex1ual readjustment (i.e., the aid of the activation of other contextual sources), so that the utterance 
no longer fits in and the speaker 's attitude of dissociation is fore grounded. 
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(13) a. [Ann and Tom enter a bar. It is crowded with people dancing, 
shouting and queuing to order drinks]. 
b. Ann: "There's nothing like a lively bar'"· 
3. Echoes of norms and standard expectations can be identified by finding an 
incompatibility in the activation of the contextual source of "encyclopaedic, factual 
information" (source A), especially the sub-group of commonsense assumptions. For 
example, the utterance (l4c) in situation (14a) (from Barbe (1995: 25)) is ironic because it 
violates default expectations about what a person is supposed to say about a blind date (his 
personality, his appearance ... ). Also, by focusing on an irrelevant aspect of the date's look, 
Ann stresses how unsatisfactory the date was: 
(14) a. fTom has arranged a datefor hisfriend Ann. After the meeting, 
Ann phones Tom to tell him how the date was]. 
b. Tom: "How was your blind date?". 
c. Ann· "He had nice shoes". 
5.4. Graded salience hypothesis 
This hypothesis was proposed by Giora et al. (Giora (1995, 1997, 1998a, 1998b, 
1999); Giora and Fein (1999a, 1999b): Giora, Fein and Schwartz (1998)). As summarized 
in Giora ( 1998b: 85) the theory assumes that 
salient (i.e., coded) meanings of words or expressions (whose degree of salicnccl> is 
affected by e.g., frequency, familiarity, conventionality) and salient (e.g., frequent) 
structures should always be accesscd and always first, regardless of contextual bias or 
speaker's intent. According to the graded salience hypothesis, direct process should apply 
when salient information is intended, i.e., when salient information is compatible with 
contextual information. A sequential process should be induced when less salient meanings 
are intended (e.g., the literal meaning of conventional idioms) On such occasions, salient 
meanings would not be bypassed. Rather, they \vould be activated first rejected as the 
intended meaning and reinterpreted in consistency with the principle of relevance. J.1 
This quote shows how close the terminology in this paper and the graded salience 
hypothesis are. According to the new terminology (bypassed·entertained) there are also 
aspects of literal meaning (rewritten now as the proposition expressed by the utterance) 
13 "A word's salient meanings are those coded in the mental lexicon. Their degree of salience may be affected by e.g .. 
conventionality, familiarity, frequency. or prototypicality. According to the graded salience hypothesis (Giora 
( 1997)), salient meanings should always be accessed and always first, regardless of conte:\tual information. The 
graded salience hypothesis, thus, predicts that less salient ironies (which depend on conte:\1 for their interpretation) 
would be processed literally initially'" (Giora ( 1998a)). 
14 This theory adds, in fact, to Giora 's previous theory of'' irony as negation''. In Giora ( 199 5: 240-241) she claims 
that "irony does not cancel the indirectly negated message[ ... }1\'or does it necessarily implicate its opposite [ ... ] 
Rather, it entertains both the explicit and implicated messages so that the dissimilarity between them may be 
computed". Her claim is close to Bredin ·s ( 1997) and is certainly close to the hypothesis posited by the criterion. 
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which are ahvays processed, no matter what literal/nonliteral interpretation is intended. H 
also predicts duality of literal/nonliteral awareness when the contextual support (in terms 
of incompatibility with the information from one or multiple activated sources) is very 
poor ("not biasing··, to use Giora · s own term). The graded salience hypothesis also 
contemplates the possibility of direct access to irony: "[it] predicts that less familiar, non-
salient ironies should be processed literally initially. However, salient, familiar ironies 
such as wise guy, big deal (whose ironic meaning is coded) should be accessed directly" 
(ibid., 89). In other words, "when salience and context mismatch (salience and contextual 
information don't fit) this triggers inferencing (ironic interpretation). This means that 
when the literal meaning of nonconventional ironies does not match contextual information, 
this triggers ironic interpretation. Or when the salient (conventional i.e., ironic) meaning 
of conventional ironies does not match a literally biasing context, this would involve 
sequentiality (whereupon the ironic meaning should be rejected as the intended meaning 
and the literal meaning would be derived)"' (Giora, personal communication). 
In my opinion, it is clear, given Giora's picture of irony processing, hm' the criterion 
(Yus ( 1998a, 2000)) and bypassed/entertained propositions may be used to predict \vhen 
salienUnon-salicnt meanings of utterances arc processed or rejected, by resorting to one 
single fonnula based on the determining influence of one or several irony-relevant contextual 
sources. Besides, the criterion provides a fine-grained analysis of the extent to which the 
proposition expressed is found relevant and fitting to the speaker's intended interpretation. 
beyond the general assumption that this proposition always has to be processed. 
5.5. Pretense theor~· 
This theory was proposed by Clark and Gcrrig ( 1984 ). As its name indicates, in this 
case it is suggested that irony involves the speaker's pretense rather than echoic mention. 
and the theory also exploits Clark's (1996) analysis of communicative layers. Irony 
necessarily involves two of these layers: one real and one implied. For instance, in situation 
(15a). Peter's statement (15b) is ironic because there is a contrast between layer I, where 
real life is taking place. and layer 2. a fictional world implied by Peter's words: 
( 15) a. [Someone pushes Peter aside when entering a room 1. 
b Peter: " I love people who push me aside and don 'I apologize!"'. 
Layer 1: Peter pretends that the event in layer 2 is taking place. 
Layer 2: ]m plied Peter says that he loves people who push him aside and 
don 'I apologize 
From this perspective. a person uttering an ironic utterance such as 1rhat /ove~v 
weatherl in the pouring rain \vonld be pretending to be someone else. an unseeing person. 
perhaps, and even pretending to be talking to some person other than the listener. According 
to Gibbs (1994: 386). ""when listeners recognize this pretense. they should understand that 
the speaker is expressing a derogatory attihtde tmvard the idea expressed. the imaginary 
speaker. and the imaginal} listener"·. 
Mariscal Chicano ( 1994: 339) finds limitations in this theory. For instance. it posits 
eYen more restrictiYe criteria of identification than S&\V's echoic mention theory. since 
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the hearer has to recognize who or what kind of person the ironic speaker is pretending to 
be and who he or she is pretending to address. · 
Intuitively, the criterion would also account for the assumed activation of pretense 
which underlies this theory. Basically, some incompatibility with the information prm·ided 
by the contextual sources D (background knowledge of speaker's biographical data) and 
occasionally A (factual and commonsense assumptions) should be detected. Contextual 
source E (mutual kno\\·Iedge) is also essential for this theory: "a listener 's understanding 
of an ironic utterance depends crucially on the common ground he or she believes is shared 
by the ironist and the audience -their mutual beliefs, mutual knm:vledge, and mutual 
assumptions" (Clark and Gcrrig (1984: 124)). The quantity and quality of these contextual 
activations will determine the bypassed or entertamed attribute of the proposition e:\:pressed. 
In any case, it is doubtful that the notion of pretense can cover all the multiplicity of ironic 
situations that can be found in ordinary conversations (see Barbe (1995: 48)). 
5.6. Allusional pretense theory 
This theory, proposed by Kumon-Nakamura (1993) and Kumon-Nakamura et al. 
( 1995), seems to be a combination of S& W's echoic mention theory and Clark and Gerrig ·s 
pretense theory. According to Glucksberg (1995: 53), pragmatic insincerity is necessary 
for irony, but not sufficient: an allusion to some norm, expectation or convention also has 
to be made, since "a necessary property of discourse irony is an allusion to some prediction, 
expectation, preference, or norm that has been violated. Thus, the allusional function of 
irony is not simply a type of topical reference or cohesion, but refers specifically to a 
discrepancy between what is expected (\vhat should be) and what actually is". 
In short, two major claims underlie this theory (Kumon-Nakamura et al. (1995: 5)): 
(a) "Ironic utterances are allusive since they call the listener 's attention to some expectation 
that has been violated"; and (b) "pragmatic insincerity is a criteria! feature of ironic 
utterances". For example, in situation (16a), Ann's utterance (16b) is ironic because it 
alludes to a social norm: drivers should always signal when turning (in Glucksberg (ibid. : 
54)). Besides, there is a touch of insincerity, easy to work out, in Ann's fake praise to the 
driver: 
(16) a. [Ann is driving Suddenly the driver in .front turns leji abruptly 
without signalling]. 
b_ Ann: "Ijusllove people who signal when turning!". 
The two conditions (allusion and insincerity) are necessary to perceive irony. By 
definition, the broad mechanism of allusion replaces S& W's narrower proposal of echoic 
interpretation: "The act of echoing, be it via mention or interpretation, is necessarily an 
act of allusion. By alluding to someone else's explicit or implicit thoughts, beliefs, or 
actions, a speaker can call a listener's attention to those thoughts, beliefs or actions" (Kumon-
Nakamura et al. (ibid.: 18))_ 
The criterion would explain ( 16) as an example of incompatibility between the 
information provided by the proposition expressed by ( I6b ), which may in fact be a true 
opinion of Ann's, and the information provided by the leading contextual source B (physical 
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environment), that is, a driver not signalling. The incompatibility with other supportive 
contextual sources such as Ann's possible ironic tone of voice (source C), and maybe also 
the hearer's knowledge of Aim's opinion about what it takes to be a good driver (source D) 
would surely make the intended irony much easier to access and process, and would lead to 
the so-called bypassed 'proposition expressed'. · 
6. Concluding remarks 
In this article the criterion of optimal accessibility to irony (Yus (1998a; 2000)) has 
been complemented with nelv ad hoc terminology to account for the different possibilities 
in the processing of ironic interpretations that can arise in ordinary conversations. The 
article relies on the hypothesis that the identification of irony (and the cognitive effort 
required for its processing) depends on the hearer's detection of incompatibilities benveen 
the proposition expressed by the speaker's utterance and the information provided by one 
or several contextual sources (one of them highly salient, called leading contextual source, 
enough by itself to trigger a search for the irony-related attitude of dissociation and echoic 
quality of the utterance, plus one or several supportive contextual sources) which may be 
activated simultaneously during the interpretation of the utterance. Different degrees of 
contextual activation lead to different degrees in the processing of the proposition expressed 
(which were labelled bypassed and entertained), as part of the general, relevance-seeking 
mental process involved in the interpretation of ironic utterances. 
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